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New firm location decisions, relative to incumbents may be based on a choice between two 
types of advantages: natural advantages or those that arise from social embeddedness, the 
latter of which may particularly include knowledge spillovers. We analyze the relative 
importance of geographically bounded location factors based on data from 103 manufacturing 
industries across 327 West German and 111 East German districts. Our micro-geographic 
analysis reveals that the two parts of the country vary in their pattern of new firm location. In 
East Germany, only 5 percent of the industries reveal start-up localization patterns beyond 
what natural advantages would suggest compared to 40 percent in West Germany. 
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1. Introduction 
An entrepreneur’s decision as to where to set up business may be influenced by diverse 
factors. Natural advantages may be one such determinant, including proximity to important 
input factors (e.g., timber, coal, wool, or water) or proximity to markets with a high demand 
for the produced output (Weber 1909). Selecting a location based on natural advantages will 
of necessity narrow the choice. While such factors obviously played an important role in the 
early stages of industrialization, they are today a dominant factor for only a few industries, for 
example, shipbuilding, which requires proximity to at least some water if not to the sea itself. 
According to Ellison and Glaeser’s (1999) broad definition of natural advantages, unskilled 
labor could also fall under this rubric in the case of labor intensive industries. Based on their 
definition, Ellison and Glaeser conclude that natural advantages account for up to 50 percent 
of the localization they observe for U.S. manufacturing industries. 
Another type of advantage that may have some influence on the decision of where to locate a 
new business is social embeddedness, which includes the benefit of region-specific 
knowledge spillovers (Feldman 1994, 2001). Entrepreneurs may derive important benefits 
from being embedded in local networks of social relationships that allow for diverse 
knowledge flows and create mutual trust, thereby facilitating the process of resource 
generation (Stuart & Sorenson 2005; Möbius & Szeidl 2007). Moreover, local knowledge 
spillovers might also occur in an inter-firm dimension when employees change employers or 
decide to be become self-employed. Klepper (2007) emphasizes how the latter source of 
regional knowledge spillover can lead to the creation of a particular type of new firm known 
as a spinoff. Spinoffs may especially benefit from locating in close proximity to their 
incubator organizations and keeping in contact with their former colleagues (Klepper 2007). 
Empirical research shows that entrepreneurs generally tend to locate their ventures close to   3
their former workplace or residence due to the advantages inherent in established social 
relationships (Stam 2007). Apparently, social embeddedness and a familiar regional 
environment can reduce, at least to some degree, the rather high risk of a new venture. 
To analyze new business location decisions in relation to location of incumbents we apply 
point pattern statistics (cf. Cressie 1993) and analyze the distance of start-ups to their 
neighboring incumbents. Taking the region’s endowment of natural advantages as necessary 
condition for firm location, we compare the actual distribution of entrant location to a 
distribution based merely on natural advantage. We use information on start-ups and 
incumbents in 103 industries across 327 German districts in West Germany and 111 districts 
in East Germany. We limit our analyses to manufacturing industries because manufacturing 
usually requires some initial production facility investment. Such investments, particularly if 
they involve sunk costs, should have some rational influence on location decisions. The same 
is not true for the service sector, where most firms’ success depends on local demand, rather 
than natural advantages or knowledge spillovers. Therefore, the location decisions of service 
sector firms should mostly be based on factors other than the ones analyzed in this paper.
1 
We believe that Germany is a particularly interesting country for such an analysis because 
even though the country operates under a fairly uniform framework, the prevailing structural 
differences between West and East Germany permit a quasi-international comparison. We 
assume that East Germany has not yet developed a stable industry structure, as compared to 
West Germany, and thus will not exhibit the same degree of spatial industry concentration 
experienced in West Germany. Indeed, our analysis reveals different patterns of location 
decisions between the two parts of the country. In West Germany, up to 40 percent of the 
industries show localized start-up patterns beyond what would be expected based on natural   4
advantage alone. This figure is only 5 percent in East Germany. These findings highlight the 
ongoing effects of two formerly different economic systems. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we motivate our empirical 
analyses in more detail and further distinguish between natural advantages and other 
geographically bounded location factors as drivers of new business location decisions. 
Section 3 introduces the data and the empirical methodology. The results of the analysis are 
presented in Section 4; Section 5 concludes. 
2. Proximity to Incumbents 
One of the decisions involved in starting a new business is, of necessity, where to put it. 
Choosing a location depends on various factors, all of which fit neatly into Marshall’s (1920) 
ideas about external economies of scale. According to Marshall (1920), firms cluster around 
specific locations to take advantage of three types of economies that eventually compose a 
region’s location factors: (1) economies resulting from access to a common labor market and 
shared public goods, such as infrastructure or educational institutions; (2) economies from 
saved transportation and transaction costs due to the regional proximity of firms along the 
supply chain; and (3) economies from spillovers that result from industry secrets being readily 
discerned due to proximity.
2 
Consideration of these three Marshallian externalities has led to important developments in 
two distinct, but not completely independent, fields of economic theory: the new economic 
                                                                                                                                        
1 In retail services, for example, the spatial distribution of the population can be expected to be a main factor for 
location decisions.  
2 See e.g. Ellison et al. (2008) for an empirical test of Marshall’s theories of industry agglomeration. In their 
analysis, the authors consider both, the discrete index introduced by Ellison and Glaeser (1997) and an 
approximation of the continuous metric of Duranton and Overman (2005) to examine which industries locate 
near one another.   5
geography and the endogenous growth theory.
3 Both aim at explaining the importance of 
industry agglomeration to dynamics and growth, but each stresses the importance of different 
agglomerative forces. The new economic geography focuses on pecuniary externalities as 
explanation for regional industry concentrations; the endogenous growth theory emphasizes 
knowledge externalities, arguing that “intellectual breakthroughs must cross hallways and 
streets more easy than oceans and continents” (Glaeser et al. 1992, p. 1127). 
Natural cost advantages most notably occur in the production sphere. For example, in the 
wine industry, they result from a suitable climate; for shipbuilding, it is a location in 
proximity to water; and in labor-intensive industries, it is lower wages (Ellison & Glaeser 
1999). In contrast, knowledge spillover advantages result from smart people being around 
other smart people working on similar things and benefiting from each other’s knowledge and 
insight (Griliches 1992). Silicon Valley is a well-known example of knowledge spillover. In 
this region, highly skilled people often hop from job to job, thereby disseminating ideas 
among neighboring firms (Saxenian 1994), or they simply meet each other after work and 
“trade information” informally (von Hippel 1987). Knowledge externalities thus support 
creativity as well as to the creation of new knowledge that can either be commercialized by 
incumbent firms or by new entrants (Antonelli 2005; Florida et al. 2008; Lee et al. 2004).
4 
In making the decision as to where to locate a new business, natural advantage might serve as 
an initial means of narrowing the choice by limiting it to only those places that can support 
specific needs. If the entire location decision was based on this decision alone, the choice 
would be more or less arbitrary between all suitable places and the location of new businesses 
would be only “as concentrated as it would be expected to be had the plants in the industry 
                                            
3 Krugman’s (1991) book, The Geography of Trade, is regarded as the basis for the new economic geography, 
and Romer’s (1986, 1990) contributions are the groundwork for endogenous growth theory.   6
chosen locations by throwing darts at a map” (Ellison & Glaeser 1997, p. 890). However, 
there is good reason to believe that an entrepreneur’s location decision is not based on the 
natural advantage factor alone, and thus is not arbitrary but locally bounded because 
entrepreneurs can better recognize and exploit opportunities in their home region than 
elsewhere (Feldman 2001; Michelacci & Silva 2007; Stam 2007). According to Sanders and 
Nee (1996) and Stuart and Sorenson (2005) there are different ways regional embeddedness 
generates resources that are especially supportive of entrepreneurship. One of these ways is 
via social contacts that can provide a diverse variety of information helpful in the recognition 
and evaluation of opportunities (Hayek 1937). Another way is others’ past experience with 
the entrepreneur, which can facilitate access to resources necessary to exploit an opportunity 
(Amit et al. 1990; Camerer & Lovallo 1999; Möbius & Szeidl 2007; Petersen & Rajan 2002). 
These arguments suggest that entrepreneurship is strongly shaped by regional conditions and 
that it can be regarded as a regional phenomenon (Feldman 2001). 
Research on the geography of knowledge and the importance of knowledge spillovers 
(Audretsch & Feldman 1996) supports this idea of entrepreneurship as a regional 
phenomenon. According to this work, knowledge flows within a region are the result of the 
close interconnection between the social and the economic spheres. Knowledge spills from 
firm to firm via the social network, for instance, when friends who work for different firms 
swap ideas after work (Saxenian 1994). Here, social life acts as a knowledge multiplier and 
increases regional knowledge production. In this environment, knowledge is a local public 
good that benefits all firms and individuals connected to the local network (Fallick et al. 
2006). A firm’s production methods and R&D discoveries become, at least to some extent, 
common knowledge, or, as Marshall (1920) put it “as it were in the air.” However, not all 
                                                                                                                                        
4 In reality, pecuniary externalities and knowledge externalities may also complement each other, a case 
considered by Fujita and Thisse’s (2003) model, which integrates knowledge externalities in a classical new   7
knowledge produced is commercialized by incumbent firms, thus resulting in a pool of non-
commercialized knowledge (Cassiman & Ueda 2006). 
The regional knowledge pool is basically accessible to everyone, but because a great deal of it 
consists of tacit knowledge, effective access and exploitation requires social contacts and past 
experience. Accordingly, locals, most particularly that subset of locals who previously 
worked for an incumbent firm, are most likely to commercialize the unexploited knowledge 
by founding a new firm, a spinoff. According to Klepper and Thompson (2006), management 
decisions to abandon some ideas in favor of pursuing others can lead to sufficient 
disagreement within the firm such that some employees resign and start a new venture. The 
authors use the example of several industries to illustrate their theory that disagreement can 
lead to spinoff. In an extension of this work, Klepper (2007) conducted a detailed spinoff 
analysis, one conclusion of which was that spinoffs locate in proximity to their parents—the 
apple doesn’t fall far from the tree. 
In the following empirical section of the paper, we take a look at new entrants in the 
manufacturing industries and analyze their location decision across German regions relative 
to incumbents in the same industry. We take as given that for manufacturing industries, 
regional endowment of natural advantages is a necessary condition for firm location. 
However, there are many areas of Germany with natural advantages supportive of 
manufacturing. If some of these areas are more concentrated than others, there should be other 
region-specific location factors than natural advantages that influence new entrants’ location 
relative to incumbents. Moreover, we investigate whether the difference in location pattern 
that we find between East and West Germany is the result of the two parts being influenced 
by two different economic regimes for nearly 50 years. We suspect that the East German 
                                                                                                                                        
economic geography model.   8
transformation process may not yet have developed a stable industry structure, with its 
accompanying degree of spatial industry concentration, so that East German establishments 
are still not able to benefit in the same way from geographical concentration as do their West 
German counterparts. If this turns out to be true, natural advantages should have a stronger 
effect on new business location decisions in East Germany than in West Germany. 
3. Method and Data 
3.1 Method 
To determine the location of start-ups relative to neighboring incumbents, we apply point 
pattern statistics (cf. Cressie 1993) that describe patterns of spatial processes. For each start-
up we know the distance d (in kilometers) to all incumbents in the same industry. Using this 
information, we calculate for each start-up i the 5
th percentile and the 10
th percentile of the 
distance to incumbents in the industry. Ranked by distance, the 5
th (10
th) percentile (p5, p10) 
is the value that separates 5 percent (10 percent) of the establishments whose distances are 
ranked below this value from the remaining 95 percent (90 percent) that are ranked above it. 
Therefore, it corresponds to the start-up’s distance to the 5 percent (10 percent) nearest 
establishment. 
) 5 ( 5 ij i d p =  and  ) 10 ( 10 ij i d p =          ( 1 a   a n d   1 b )  
We are interested in analyzing the distribution of these two measures over all start-ups in an 
industry. We know which district each start-up and incumbent is located in. Although this 
information is less detailed than an exact address, it is sufficient for our analysis because 
German districts are relatively small.
5 Therefore, as an approximation of the distance between 
                                            
5 German districts (Landkreise) are considerably smaller than what is usually defined as a labor market area. 
Historically, the size of these districts was determined by the distance an administrative officer could travel 
round trip horse wagon in one day. Today, the reasoning behind these historic limitations still prevails as 
recently mentioned by the German Constitutional Court when blocking the enlargement of five East German   9
a start-up and an incumbent we use the distance between the geographic center of the start-
up’s district and the geographic center of the incumbent’s district. If a start-up and an 
incumbent are located in the same district, we set the distance to zero. 
Duranton und Overman (2005 and 2008) have recently analyzed the location patterns of UK 
manufacturing industries. Even though Duranton and Overman also apply point pattern 
statistics, their approach differs form our approach. We look at the distribution of the two 
percentiles p5 and p10, and thus concentrate on analyzing the start-ups’ incumbent neighbors 
while Duranton and Overman’s analysis is based on pair-wise distances. In doing so, we give 
emphasis to the start-up’s neighboring incumbents, an approach which is reasonable as we are 
interested in locally bounded externalities between incumbents and start-ups. 
Based on the 5
th and 10
th percentile of distances between a start-up and the incumbents in its 
industry, we compare the actual spatial distribution of start-ups to a counterfactual 
distribution. We construct this counterfactual distribution by allocating the actual number of 
start-ups in an industry equally across those districts that have at least one incumbent in the 
same industry. We take the actual spatial distribution of incumbents as given since we are not 
primarily interested in this distribution or in answering the question of whether incumbents 
are or are not agglomerated. Allocating the start-ups across only those districts with at least 
one incumbent of the same industry ensures that the district is home to sufficient natural 
advantages that it would be rational, on this basis, for the start-up to locate in that district (cf. 
Ellison & Glaeser 1997, 1999). Indeed, in our data, we never find even one start-up in a 
region that does not host an incumbent in the same industry as the start-up. 
                                                                                                                                        
districts. According to this decision, a district should not exceed a size that does not allow members of its 
administration and of the political bodies to gain adequate knowledge about the relevant issues in a reasonable 
amount of time. Therefore, we consider districts to be appropriate for this analysis.   10
The localization of start-ups relative to incumbents that is due to pecuniary (Marshallian) 
agglomeration externalities and local knowledge spillovers from incumbents is simply derived 
by comparing the medians ( ) 50 ( 5 5i p p median =  and  ) 50 ( 10 10i p p median = , respectively) of 
the actual and the counterfactual distribution of distances by means of a Wilcoxon test. If the 
median of the actual distribution is significantly (on the 5 percent level) smaller than the 
median of the counterfactual distribution, we define the start-ups to be localized relative to 
industry incumbents. This procedure is similar to that of Duranton and Overman (2005), who 
specify a distance threshold at the median plant-to-plant distance when comparing the actual 
density function of plant-to-plant distances with the counterfactual density function. Thereby, 
a specified distance threshold is required as densities sum to one over the support. As we will 
see in Section 4, both the actual and counterfactual density function have the same overall 
inverse-u-shaped pattern, allowing us to simply compare the distributions’ medians. 
3.2 Data 
Data on incumbents and start-ups are derived from the German Social Insurance Statistics. 
The German Social Insurance Statistics requires each employer to report information about 
every employee subject to obligatory social insurance. This information can be transformed 
into an establishment file that provides longitudinal information about the establishments (cf. 
Brixy & Fritsch 2004). As each establishment with at least one employee subject to social 
security has a permanent individual code number, start-up and exit can be identified: the 
appearance of a new establishment number can be interpreted as a start-up, the disappearance 
of an establishment number can be regarded as an exit. Since the unit of observation is the 
establishment, not the firm, the empirical data thus include two categories of entities: firm 
headquarters and subsidiaries. As it is well-known from the literature that “real” start-ups tend 
to be small, new establishments with more than 20 employees in the first year of their 
existence are excluded. As a result, a considerable number of new subsidiaries of large firms   11
contained in the database are not counted as real start-ups. Unfortunately, it is not possible in 
these data to distinguish between start-up in general and entry by spinoff. 
Our final data consist of the number of incumbents and start-ups in 103 three-digit 
manufacturing industries across 327 West German districts and 111 East German districts 
(excluding Berlin)
6 over the period 1998 to 2001. We restrict our analysis to manufacturing 
industries, as firms in manufacturing tend to be rather immobile, at least in the short and 
medium term, due to the relatively high physical investment necessary for starting and 
running a business in this sector. This regional stickiness allows us to argue that the location 
patterns we discover are not merely a snapshot of a particular moment in time, but are also 
valid in the longer run.  
Table 1: Number of Incumbents and Start-Ups in East and West Germany 
 West  Germany  East  Germany 
1998    
 Number of incumbents in 
manufacturing 
198,954 42,140 
 Number of start-ups in manufacturing  11,500  3,755 
1999    
 Number of incumbents in 
manufacturing 
198,886 41,752 
 Number of start-ups in manufacturing  12,930  3,714 
2000    
 Number of incumbents in 
manufacturing 
197,535 40,408 
 Number of start-ups in manufacturing  11,699  2,745 
2001    
 Number of incumbents in 
manufacturing 
194,348 39,103 
 Number of start-ups in manufacturing  10,485  2,404 
 Number of manufacturing industries  103  103 
 Number of manufacturing industries 
with at least 10 start-ups per year 
84 55 
 Number of districts   327  111 
We analyze East and West German districts separately, as a number of empirical analyses 
have shown that in the late 1990s, about 10 years after the introduction of a market economy 
in East Germany, quite different factors governed market dynamics in that region of the 
                                            
6 The Berlin region is excluded because it is not possible to make any meaningful distinction between East and 
West Germany in this region during the period under analysis.   12
country (cf. Fritsch 2004) compared to those in play in West Germany. The obvious reason 
for this is that the transformation of the former socialist system that governed the East 
German economy is a process that may well take several decades. Accordingly, the economic 
structure in East Germany may not be as stable as in West Germany. As a consequence, 
deviations between the factual spatial distribution of start-ups and the counterfactual 
distribution that is merely driven by natural advantages should be less pronounced in East 
Germany. The number of incumbents and start-ups in East and West Germany during the 
period of investigation are found in Table 1. In the analyses to follow, we restrict ourselves to 
those 84 industries (West Germany) and 55 industries (East Germany), respectively, with at 
least ten entries per year so as to have enough observations to calculate the distribution. 
Over these industries, the mean share of districts with no incumbents in West (East) Germany 
is about 30 (21) percent over years (cf. Table 2). Thereby, the minimum share is 0 percent and 
the maximum share is about 85 (64) percent. 
Table 2: Share of regions in West and East Germany with no incumbent over all industries by district type 
Mean share of districts with no incumbents over all industries 
within district type 
 
West Germany  East Germany 
District Type 
1998  1999  2000  2001  1998 1999 2000 2001 
Core  cities  21.3 21.0 21.6 21.7 9.5  8.6  10.0  8.6 
Highly urbanized districts in regions with 
large agglomerations 
18.7  18.9  18.9  18.9  14.5 16.3 16.3 16.3 
Urbanized districts in regions with large 
agglomerations 
29.5  29.4  29.8  29.3  15.6 16.3 16.9 17.0 
Rural districts in regions with large 
agglomerations 
30.5  30.5  30.5  31.3  17.2 16.7 17.6 18.3 
Central cities in regions with intermediate 
agglomerations 
29.9  30.7  31.2  31.9  18.6 18.4 18.4 19.5 
Urbanized districts in regions with 
intermediate agglomerations 
27.4  27.2  27.4  27.3  20.9 20.5 20.4 20.8 
Rural districts in regions with intermediate 
agglomerations 
34.6  35.2  35.3  35.2  22.6 22.2 21.7 22.3 
Urbanized  districts  in  rural  regions  36.0  35.7  35.3  35.3  24.8 23.8 24.4 24.8 
Rural districts in rural regions  43.5  42.6  42.3  42.8  27.0  26.4  26.2  27.3   13
4. The Location of Start-Ups Relative to Incumbents 
4.1. Results for West Germany 
Figures 1a, 1b, 2a, and 2b show the kernel density estimates of the actual and the 
counterfactual distribution of start-up distance to incumbents in Manufacture of Dairy 
Products (NACE 155) and Manufacture of Cutlery, Tools and General Hardware (NACE 
286) in 2001, groups that have also been taken as examples in Duranton and Overman 
(2008)
7. Figures 3a and 3b plot the corresponding kernel density estimates for Manufacture of 
Rubber Products (NACE 251), including the tire industry, an industry intensively analyzed by 
Buenstorf and Klepper (2009) in the context of spinoffs. The kernel density approximations of 
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respectively, where K is the standard Gaussian function and h the optimal bandwidth. Note 
that in this section, the “a” part of each figure is a plot of the kernel density estimates for the 
5
th percentile start-up’s distance to incumbents, whereas the “b” parts of the figures are plots 
of the kernel density estimates for the 10
th percentile of the start-up’s distance to incumbents. 
Both actual and counterfactual kernel density functions are inversely u-shaped for all 
industries in our sample. This means that the bulk of the neighboring incumbent 
establishments is not located in close proximity to the start-ups but is operating at locations 
                                            
7 Duranton and Overman (2008) choose these industries as examples because they represented outliers in their 
analysis. Note that Duranton and Overman analyze four-digit industries, whereas our data are at the three-digit 
level. Therefore, the industries chosen by Duranton and Overman are subgroups of the industries presented here. 
The NACE (Nomenclature générale des ACtivités Economique) is an international industry classification system 
consisting of up to six digits.   14
which are about 50 to 100 kilometers away. Visual comparison of the actual and the 
counterfactual kernel density functions suggest that they might differ for Manufacture of 
Cutlery, Tools and General Hardware (NACE 286) and Manufacture of Rubber Products 
(NACE 251), i.e., the actual median appears to be considerably smaller than the 
counterfactual median. By contrast, actual and counterfactual densities do not appear to be 
very different in Manufacture of Dairy Products (NACE 155). 
Figure 1: Kernel Density Estimates of 5
th Percentile (a) and 10
th Percentile (b) of Distance to Incumbents in 
Manufacture of Dairy Products (155) in 2001 
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Figure 2: Kernel Density Estimates of 5
th Percentile (a) and 10
th Percentile (b) of Distance to Incumbents in 
Manufacture of Cutlery, Tools and General Hardware (286) in 2001 
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Figure 3: Kernel Density Estimates of 5
th Percentile (a) and 10
th Percentile (b) of Distance to Incumbents in 
Manufacture of Rubber Products (251) in 2001 
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Based on these illustrative cases, we calculate the difference between actual and 
counterfactual median for both the 5
th percentile of start-up’s distance to incumbents (p5) and 
the 10
th percentile of startup’s distance to incumbents (p25). Figures 4a and 4b show the 
histograms of these differences. The average median of the actual p5 over the years of 
analysis and the industries is 52 kilometers, the counterfactual p5 is 64 kilometers, the actual 
p10 is 80 kilometers, and the counterfactual p10 is 94 kilometers. 
In some industries, the difference between the actual and counterfactual median of the 5th and 
the 10
th percentile is close to zero, suggesting that localization of start-ups is more driven by 
natural advantage than by externalities stemming from the presence of incumbents. A 
Wilcoxon test on the equality of medians reveals that the actual median is significantly (at the 
5 percent level) smaller than the counterfactual median in only 23 industries (about 27 percent 
of our sample) when taking the 10
th percentile of start-up’s distance to incumbents.
8 When 
taking the 5
th percentile of a start-up’s distance to incumbents, the actual median is 
significantly smaller than the counterfactual median in 34 industries (about 40 percent of our  
                                            
8 Duranton and Overman (2008) find for the United Kingdom that in 27 out of 203 industries (13 percent of all 
industries), start-ups relative to incumbents are globally localized.   16
Figure 4a: Histogram of Difference Between Actual and Counterfactual Median Based on the 5
th Percentile of 
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Figure 4b: Histogram of Difference Between Actual and Counterfactual Median Based on the 10
th Percentile of 
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sample).
9 We thus consider only those industries where the significant difference holds for at 
least three out of the four years between 1998 and 2001. This method ensures that we focus 
our attention on relatively stable patterns over time, ignoring certain random deviation that 
occurs in at most one or two periods. Table 3 summarizes these industries. 
Table 3: Localized Industries 
Industry localized according to the … percentile of 





th percentile  10
th percentile 
158  Manufacture of other food products  x  x 
182  Manufacture of other wearing apparel 
and accessories  
x x 
201  Sawmilling and planing of woods; 
impregnation of wood 
x x 
203  Manufacture of builders’ carpentry 
and joinery 
x x 
205  Manufacture of other products of 
wood; manufacture of articles of cork, 
straw , and plaiting materials 
x – 
211  Manufacture of pulp, paper, and 
paperboard 
x – 
212  Manufacture of articles of paper and 
paperboard 
x – 
221 Publishing  x  x 
222  Printing and service activities related 
to printing 
x x 
251  Manufacture of rubber products  x  x 
252  Manufacture of plastic products  x  x 
273  Other first processing of iron and steel x  x 
274  Manufacture of basic precious and 
non-ferrous metals 
x – 
281  Manufacture of structural metal 
products 
x x 
285  Treatment and coating of metals; 
general mechanical engineering 
x x 
286  Manufacture of cutlery, tools, and 
general hardware 
x x 
287  Manufacture of other fabricated metal 
products 
x x 
291  Manufacture of machinery for the 
production and use of mechanical 
power, except aircraft, vehicle and 
cycle engines 
x – 
292  Manufacture of other general purpose 
machinery 
x x 
                                            
9 The difference between the factual and the counterfactual number of start-ups in a district is obviously not 
significantly shaped by the spatial spread of natural advantages, i.e. the share of districts in which at least one 
incumbent establishments of the industry is located. A correlation coefficient for the relationship between the 
difference of the number of factual start-up minus the number of counterfactual start-ups and the share of 
districts without an incumbent in the respective industry has a value of 0.19 and is not statistically significant.   18
294  Manufacture of machine tools  x  x 
295  Manufacture of special purpose 
machinery 
x x 
300  Manufacture of office machinery and 
computers 
x – 
312  Manufacture of electricity distribution 
and control apparatus 
x – 
313  Manufacture of isolated wire and 
cable 
x – 
316  Manufacture of electrical equipment 
n.e.c. 
x x 
322  Manufacture of television and radio 
transmitters and apparatus for line 
telephony and line telegraphy 
x x 
331  Manufacture of medical and surgical 
equipment and orthopedic appliances  
x x 
332  Manufacture of instruments and 
appliances for measuring, checking, 
testing, navigating, and other purposes 
except industrial process control 
equipment  
x x 
334  Manufacture of optical instruments 
and photographic equipment 
x – 
342  Manufacture of bodies (coachwork) 
for motor vehicles; manufacture of 
trailers and semi-trailers  
x – 
351  Building and repairing of ships and 
boats 
x x 
361 Manufacture  of  furniture  x  x 
362  Manufacture of jewellery and related 
articles 
x x 
372  Recycling of non-metal waste and 
scrap 
x – 
Note: x = industry localized according to the respective percentile; – = industry not localized according to the 
respective percentile 
4.2. Results for East Germany 
We repeated the analysis for East Germany across the same time period, i.e., 1998 to 2001. 
Again, we calculate the counterfactual by allocating the start-ups across only those districts 
with at least one incumbent. The mean share of districts with no incumbents over all 
industries and years is about 21 percent. Thereby, the minimum share is 0 percent and the 
maximum share is about 64 percent (cf. Table 2). These smaller shares in East Germany as 
compared to West Germany hint at a more even spatial distribution of incumbents in East 
Germany. There are two possible explanations for this result. First, natural advantages of the 
industries are more evenly spread in East Germany. Second, the location structure in former 
socialist East Germany is not as adjusted to the local conditions as is the case in West   19
Germany. While we have no indication for a wider spread of natural advantages in East 
Germany we suppose that this result does indeed reflect a lower degree of regional 
specialization and of adjustment to locational conditions in East Germany. 
At first glance, the kernel density estimates for our illustrative industries—Manufacture of 
Dairy Products (155), Manufacture of Cutlery, Tools and General Hardware (286), and 
Manufacture of Rubber Products (251)—already look different to those for West Germany 
(cf. Figures 5a, 5b, 6a, 6b, 7a, and 7b). 
The average median over years and industries for the actual p5 is 31 kilometers, for 
counterfactual p5 it is 37 kilometers, for actual p10 it is 51 kilometers, and for counterfactual 
p10 it is 56 kilometers.
10 In East Germany, the differences between actual and counterfactual 
outcomes are smaller than the corresponding West German figures. In relative terms, the 
counterfactual 5
th percentile in West German is about 23 percent larger than the actual p5, as 
compared to 16 percent in East Germany. For the p10, this difference amounts to about 18 
percent in West Germany, compared to about 10 percent in East Germany. Figures 8a and 8b 
are histograms of the differences between the actual and counterfactual median for both the 
5
th percentile of start-up’s distance to incumbents (p5) and the 10
th percentile average start-
up’s distance to incumbents (p10). Here, we see that many differences are close to zero. A 
Wilcoxon test on the equality of medians reveals that the actual median is significantly (at the 
5 percent level) smaller than the counterfactual median in only three industries (Manufacture 
of other Textiles, Publishing, and Treatment and Coating of Metals, General Mechanical 
Engineering (285) when taking the 5
th percentile or the 10
th percentile of start-up’s distance to 
incumbents. Again, we have only counted industries where this holds for at least three years 
between 1998 and 2001, i.e., we have only taken into account relatively stable patterns over   20
time. These results suggest that start-ups tend to be localized in only 5 percent of the 
manufacturing industries in East Germany in comparison to about 40 percent of the 
manufacturing industries in West Germany. This supports our hypothesis that in the East 
German transformation process, a stable industry structure has not yet developed that could 
lead to an actual spatial distribution that is different from the counterfactual distribution 
driven only by natural advantages. 
Figure 5: Kernel Density Estimates of 5
th Percentile (a) and 10
th Percentile (b) of Distance to Incumbents in 
Manufacture of Dairy Products (155) in 2001 











































Figure 6: Kernel Density Estimates of 5
th Percentile (a) and 10
th Percentile (b) of Distance to Incumbents in 
Manufacture of Cutlery, Tools and General Hardware (286) in 2001 


















































                                                                                                                                        
10 Note in this context that East Germany, with a size of 108,000 km², is considerably smaller than West 
Germany, which is 248,000 km² in size. This difference is reflected in the different median plant distances of 
249 km for West Germany vs. 152 km for East Germany.   21
Figure 7: Kernel Density Estimates of 5
th Percentile (a) and 10
th Percentile (b) of Distance to Incumbents in 
Manufacture of Rubber Products (251) in 2001 

















































Figure 8a: Histogram of Difference between Actual and Counterfactual Median Based on the 5
th Percentile of 
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Figure 8b: Histogram of Difference between Actual and Counterfactual Median Based on the 10
th Percentile of 
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4.3. Comparison between East and West Germany 
The left panel of Tables 4a and 4b shows the shares of districts with a difference between the 
actual and the counterfactual number of start-ups larger than the 90
th percentile for West and 
East Germany, respectively. The values are aggregates for all manufacturing industries with at 
least ten start-ups per year and are reported by district type according to the classification of 
the German Federal Office for Building and Regional Planning (2003). This classification is 
based on regional population density and settlement structure. For West Germany, there is an 
immediately recognizable break after the district type highly urbanized districts in regions 
with large agglomerations, meaning that the share of districts with a difference between the 
actual and counterfactual number of start-ups larger than the 90
th percentile drops when going 
from highly urbanized districts in regions with large agglomerations to urbanized districts in   23
regions with large agglomerations. In East Germany, the same drop appears between core 
cities and highly urbanized districts in regions with large agglomerations. 
Table 4a: Share of Districts (in percent) with Differences Between Actual Number of Start-Ups and 
Counterfactual Number of Start-Ups Larger than the 90
th Percentile of the Respective Difference and Share of 
Incumbents (by District Type), West Germany 
Difference Share  of  Incumbents 
District Type 
1998  1999  2000  2001  1998 1999 2000 2001 
Core cities  5.8   6.3   5.5   5.8   17.9   17.6   17.5   17.3  
Highly urbanized districts in regions with 
large agglomerations 
6.9   8.4   6.1   5.7   20.6   20.7   20.7   20.8  
Urbanized districts in regions with large 
agglomerations 
2.3   2.6   2.5   2.3   8.3   8.3   8.3   8.4  
Rural districts in regions with large 
agglomerations 
0.8   1.5   1.3   1.7   2.2   2.2   2.2   2.2  
Central cities in regions with intermediate 
agglomerations 
1.2   1.9   2.2   1.6   4.1   4.1   4.1   4.1  
Urbanized districts in regions with 
intermediate agglomerations 
2.7   3.7   3.1   2.9   23.7   23.7   23.8   23.8  
Rural districts in regions with intermediate 
agglomerations 
1.0   1.2   1.6   1.4   10.7   10.7   10.7   10.7  
Urbanized districts in rural regions  1.1   0.9   1.2   1.2   8.6   8.6   8.6   8.6  
Rural districts in rural regions  0.7   0.7   1.0   0.8   3.6   3.6   3.6   3.7  
The right panel of Tables 3a and 3b shows the shares of incumbent firms in manufacturing 
industries by district type. For West Germany, core cities and highly urbanized districts in 
regions with large agglomerations are the district types with the highest share of incumbents 
in manufacturing industries. The same is not true for core cities in East Germany. Altogether, 
East German incumbents are more evenly distributed across district types than are West 
German incumbents. By contrast, East German start-ups are predominantly located in core   24
cities compared to the counterfactual distribution which, eventually, explains why we rarely 
find localized industries, i.e. industries where the median of the actual distribution is 
significantly (on the 5 percent level) smaller than the median of the counterfactual, in East 
Germany. Figure 9 and Figure 10 map the distribution of the differences between the actual 
and the counterfactual number of start-ups and the share of incumbents in manufacturing 
industries, respectively, across West (a) and East German (b) districts. 
Table 4b: Share of Districts (in percent) with Differences Between Actual Number of Start-Ups and 
Counterfactual Number of Start-Ups Larger than the 90th Percentile of the Respective Difference and Share of 
Incumbents (by District Type), East Germany 
Difference Share  of  Incumbents 
District Type 
1998 1999 2000  2001 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Core cities  12.7   17.7   9.5   10.0   8.1   8.8   8.6   8.6  
Highly urbanized districts in regions with 
large agglomerations 
3.6   4.5   1.8   2.7   2.4   2.2   2.2   2.2  
Urbanized districts in regions with large 
agglomerations 
5.2   4.7   3.6   2.5   12.6   11.7   11.7   11.7  
Rural districts in regions with large 
agglomerations 
4.0   6.0   4.3   5.4   12.7   12.8   13.0   13.0  
Central cities in regions with intermediate 
agglomerations 
5.9   5.0   4.5   4.5   7.0   7.1   7.0   6.9  
Urbanized districts in regions with 
intermediate agglomerations 
2.9   4.2   3.6   2.9   17.7   17.7   17.7   17.8  
Rural districts in regions with 
intermediate agglomerations 
2.0   3   2.8   2.0   15.1   15.3   15.4   15.3  
Urbanized districts in rural regions  5.0   3.7   2.5   2.7   10.9   11.0   10.8   11.0  
Rural districts in rural regions  2.8   1.9   1.9   1.9   13.1   13.2   13.2   13.0    25
Figure 9: Difference between actual and counterfactual number of start-ups - mean over manufacturing 
industries with at least ten start-ups per year, 1998-2001.  
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In West Germany, the actual number of startups exceeds the counterfactual number 
particularly in the metropolitan areas around Cologne, Frankfurt, and Stuttgart (Panel (a) of 
Figure 9). These areas also exhibit an outstandingly large share of incumbents (Figure 10). All 
regions are characterized by a relatively high level of population density and there are 
obviously more than natural advantages at play that determine the localization of startups 
relative to incumbents. In East Germany (Panel (b) of Figures 9 and 10), we only find a small 
number of districts that are outstanding in both the share of incumbents and the actual number 
of startups compared to the counterfactual number. These districts are mostly located in the 
surroundings of Berlin, Dresden, and in Thuringia, south-west of Jena. All areas have already 
been important industrial agglomerations before World War II and the division of Germany.   26
Figure 10: Share of Incumbents – Mean over manufacturing industries with at least ten start-ups per year, 1998-
2001.  
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This paper’s goal was to take a closer look at new entrants’ location decisions with respect to 
natural advantages versus other locally bounded externalities. We performed point pattern 
statistics for 103 three-digit industries across 327 West German districts and 111 East German 
districts. We analyzed the location decision of start-ups across German regions relative to 
incumbents in the same industry. As expected, our results reveal different patterns in the two 
parts of Germany. For up to 20 percent of the industries analyzed in West Germany, it is not 
merely natural advantages that drive new entrants’ location decisions. For East Germany, this 
figure is 5 percent. Thus, our results suggest that for these industries, other influences beside 
simply natural advantages are at work in the location decision.   27
The differences between East and West Germany are probably due to the different economic 
systems each experienced for nearly 50 years. A number of empirical studies (Fritsch 2004; 
Fritsch & Slavtchev 2008) strongly suggest that transformation of the East German economy 
into one similar to that of West Germany may well take several decades. A lower level of 
regional industry concentration in East Germany is one result of the still existing differences 
between the two parts of the country.
11 Our finding that new businesses’ location decisions in 
East Germany are not as much localized, i.e. not as much shaped by other region-specific 
location factors than natural advantages as compared to West Germany confirms this view. 
The relatively high level of public subsidies for new as well as incumbent businesses 
available in East Germany may also play a role here because these higher subsidies lower the 
pressure to e.g. exploit the economic advantages of spillovers or enable establishments to 
survive at relatively unfavorable locations. 
Existing research on successful agglomerations, such as Silicon Valley, where advantages 
other than natural ones appear to be at work suggests that such locations are heavily 
dependent for their success on the existence of a sophisticated and well-working regional 
network. This, in turn, depends on the “investor friendliness” of a country’s legal and fiscal 
environment as well as its social institutions and overall business culture. The “systems of 
innovation” literature has been instrumental in making the connection between social 
institutions and innovation (Freeman 1987; Lundvall 1992; Nelson 1993). One of the best 
examples of this linkage is a comparison between Silicon Valley in California and Route 128 
in Boston, Massachusetts, both high-tech districts, but widely divergent in the way they 
evolved (see, e.g., Saxenian 1994). Gilson (1999), as well as Armour and Cumming (2006), 
argue that much of Silicon Valley’s greater success (compared to Route 128) is the result of 
                                            
11 In an analysis of the efficiency of regional innovation systems in Germany, Fritsch and Slavtchev (2008) find 
significantly lower efficiency estimates for East German regions, which may be regarded an indication of a 
lower level of other geographically bounded location factors than natural advantages.   28
institutional factors. Massachusetts law contains a provision regulating post-employment 
covenants not to compete, whereas California law does not. Accordingly, “any firm connected 
to the personal networks through which information and employees flowed in Silicon Valley 
could benefit from the best innovation produced in the entire cluster rather than the best 
innovation produced by their own, proprietary research and development efforts” (Fallick et 
al. 2006). 
Klepper (2009) tells a similar story with regard to institutions and their impact on the 
emergence of spinoffs. According to this line of research, the spinoff process might well be 
hampered by trade secret laws (Jackson 1998) or post-employment covenants not to compete 
(Stuart & Sorensen 2003). Both of these legal restrictions constrain individuals in the 
exploitation of regional knowledge stock, which is tantamount to inefficient resource 
utilization and may affect regional innovation and growth (Audretsch 2007). Or, put in 
another way, we can conclude that geographically bounded location factors like, for instance, 
local knowledge spillovers basically guarantee that the apple doesn’t fall far from the tree, 
i.e., new entrants choose locations in proximity to incumbents. However, depending on the 
regional environment, some trees might produce more apples than others.   29
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